GDI i BRI – GDI and BRI

Prethodna dva broja posvetili smo dvjema globalnim inicijativama koje na međunarodnu scenu uveo kineski predsjednik Xi Jinping, nudeći ih kao svoj odgovor svijetu u pogledu sigurnosti i (među)civilizacijske saradnje. Ovaj broj posvećujemo trećoj, Globalnoj razvojnoj inicijativi (GDI), koja je zapravo, hronološki došla prva, 2021 godine, u vrijeme epidemije COVID-19 koja je harala svijetom (dok je Globalna sigurnosna inicijativa – GSI godinu predložena 2022, a Globalna civilizacijska inicijativa GCI datira od ove, 2023.). Bez obzira na ovu vremensku rokadu, riječ je o tri globalne inicijative koje je Kina podarila svijetu kao svoje odgovore na probleme sa kojima se svijet današnjice susreće, a to su problemi daljeg razvoja, problemi sigurnosti, te problemi međusobnog, kulturnog (ne)razumijevanja.

Ovaj broj nije posvećen samo GDI, nego i Inicijativi “Pojas i put” (BRI), koja je prethodila trojstvu Xijevih globalnih inicijativa, znatno je starija, jer ove godine se obilježava deset godina. Upravo će u oktobru, Kina na najvišem nivou obilježiti desetu godišnjicu BRI-ja. To je najbolji odgovor na one glasove koji se čuju s vremena na vrijeme, a od vremena epidemije su znatno porasli, da je BRI izgubila svoj zamah, da izostaju veliki projekti i značajni rezultati, da je to jasno i Kinezima koji su se orijentirali na druge inicijative, a u ovom segmentu, razvojnu.

Zaista, vrijeme u kojem je nastala BRI razlikuje se od onog u kojem je Xi predložio GDI. Ali, inicijative su više paralelne trake nego što jedna poništava drugu. To je, između ostalih autora, primijetila i politologinja Anthea Mulakala, viši direktor u Međunarodnoj razvojnoj saradnji u Fondaciji za Aziju, koja je to ovako poredala: Dok je BRI orijentisan na ekonomski rast, GDI je orijentisan na razvoj. BRI isporučuje hardver i ekonomske koridore, dok se GDI fokusira na softver, sredstva za život, transfer znanja i izgradnju kapaciteta. BRI je tržišno orijentisan, gde preduzeća igraju ključnu ulogu. Nasuprot tome, GDI je orijentisan na javnost, pružajući grantove i razvojnu pomoć. Dok su putevi BRI-a uglavnom bilateralni i regionalni, uključujući MOU sa partnerskim zemljama, GDI promoviše različita partnerstva s multilateralnim organizacijama, nevladinim organizacijama i privatnim sektorom.

Pored toga što je GDI, kako vidimo komplementarna sa BRI, ona je uključena u dokumente Ujedinjenih nacija i Agende 2030, kao i Održivih razvojnih ciljeva (SDG), o čemu detaljno pišemo u ovom broju Glasa Kine, koji donosiocima političkih odluka u BiH može služiti kao uvod u multilateralni svijet kineske diplomatije.

Faruk Borić

glavni urednik magazina “Glas Kine”

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In the previous two issues, we devoted ourselves to two global initiatives introduced on the international scene by Chinese President Xi Jinping, offering them as his answer to the world in terms of security and (inter)civilizational cooperation. This issue is dedicated to the third, the Global Development Initiative (GDI), which actually, chronologically, came first, in 2021, at the time of the COVID-19 epidemic that was sweeping the world (while the Global Security Initiative – GSI was proposed for 2022, and the Global Civilization Initiative GCI date from now, 2023). Regardless of this time frame, we are talking about three global initiatives that China gave to the world as its answers to the problems the world is facing today, namely the problems of further development, security problems, and problems of mutual, cultural (mis)understanding.

This number is dedicated not only to the GDI, but also to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which preceded the trinity of Xi’s global initiatives, is significantly older, as this year marks its tenth anniversary. In October, China will mark the tenth anniversary of the BRI at the highest level. That the best answer to one voice that is heard from time to time, and since the time of the epidemic has grown significantly, is that the BRI has lost its momentum, that there are no large projects and significant results, that this is clear even to the Chinese who have focused on other and in this segment of the initiative, development.

Indeed, the time in which the BRI was conceived is different from that in which Xi proposed the GDI. But the initiatives are more parallel tracks than one canceling the other out. This, among other authors, was noticed by political scientist Anthea Mulakala, senior director in International Development Cooperation at the Asia Foundation, who put it this way: While BRI is oriented towards economic growth, GDI is oriented towards development. BRI delivers hardware and economic corridors, while GDI focuses on software, livelihoods, knowledge transfer and capacity building. BRI is market-oriented, where companies play a key role. In contrast, GDI is public-oriented, providing grants and development assistance. While BRI avenues are mainly bilateral and regional, including MOUs with partner countries, GDI promotes various partnerships with multilateral organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector.

In addition to the fact that the GDI, as we see, is complementary to the BRI, it is included in the documents of the United Nations and Agenda 2030, as well as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), which we write about in detail in this issue of Voice of China, which can serve political decision makers in BiH as an introduction to the multilateral world of Chinese diplomacy.

Faruk Boric
editor-in-chief of “Voice of China